Pedragoza vs COMELEC

Facts: Pedragoza won the 2002 Punong Barangay Elections. Sumulong filed an election protest claiming that irregularities marred the elections. Sumulong sought recount for ballots Pedragoza filed counter-protest but RTC dismissed both because the objections did not suffice to change election results. Sumulong appealed to the COMELEC, consequently the latter annulled the proclamation of Pedragoza and declare Sumulong as duly elected Punong Brangay. Pedragoza file a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC but denied. All five incumbent COMELEC Commissioners signed the resolution, except Commissioner Sadain and Tuason, without indicating the reasons for their inhibition. Pedragoza claims that the resolution of is invalid having been without a quorum due to the failure of the two commissioners to indicate their reasons for their inhibition.

Issue: W/N the resolution of COMELEC is valid.

Ruling: The resolution is valid. Even if the votes of Commissioners Sadain and Tuason are disregarded (whatever reason) a quorum still remains, with three of the then five COMELEC Commissioners voting to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. While there is no extant record of the COMELEC’s proceedings in adopting Section 1, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules, the parallel deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution on Section 13, Article VIII shed light on the purpose of the rule requiring a member of this Court and all lower collegiate courts to state his reason for taking no part in a case. Section 13, Article VIII is a devise to dissuade members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts (or in this case, the members of the COMELEC) from not taking part in the deliberation of cases, the requirement has nothing to do with the ruling involved but concerns the judge himself. Thus, noncompliance with the rule does not annul the ruling in which a judge takes no part but may be basis for holding him responsible for the omission.

Estrella vs COMELEC

Facts: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the COMELEC, raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation.

HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd. Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.

Benwaren vs COMELEC

G.R. 169393
October 2, 2009

Facts: Benwaren and Crisologo were candidates for the May 2004 elections. MBC canvassed 14 out 16 election returns only because the election returns from Precincts 8A and 16A were contested before the COMELEC. Benwaren objected the inclusion of the returns from 16A on the ground that there were irregularities in its preparation. Crisologo filed a petition to exclude the returns from precinct 8A. The MBC withhold the proclamation it contended that the return from 16A would affect the result of the election. Benwaren filed a petition to reopen the ballot box from 16A for recount but the MBC proclaimed Crisologo as Mayor based on the results of the remaining uncontested returns despite the pending petition of Crisologo. Benwaren filed a petition to annul the proclamation and to declare illegal proceedings of the MBC. According to Benwaren MBC acted without authorization from COMELEC and the proclamation was based on an incomplete canvass. The election returns from Precinct 8A and 16A which would materially affect the results of the election were not counted.

Issues: W/N the proclamation of Crisologo is valid

Ruling: Valid. Under sec 20 (i) of RA 7166, “The Board of Canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the object brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.”

Petitioner Benwaren himself admitted that excluding the votes cast in the two contested precincts, he (Benwaren) had 807 votes, while Crisologo had 914 votes. If the votes in Precinct No. 8A as reflected on the contested return are added to their votes in the uncontested precincts, the result would be in favor of private respondent Crisologo who still emerges the winner by a margin of six (6) votes.

It bears noting that it was private respondent Crisologo and not petitioner, who contested the election return of Precinct No. 8A, so petitioner cannot claim to get more than what is reflected in the election return of that precinct. The propriety of including or excluding the said return, therefore, is thereby rendered moot and academic. Consequently, the proclamation of respondent Crisologo has to be sustained.

Albaña, et al. vs Belo, et al.

G.R. No. 158734
November 12, 2003

Facts: On May 18, 2001, Albaña and Belo for the position of mayor the latter was duly elected and proclaimed winner. On June 23, 2001 Belo filed a complaint against Albaña with the COMELEC Law Department alleging that the latter committed acts of terrorism punishable under Sec 261(e) of the OEC. Belo prayed that Albaña be charged of the said crimes and disqualified from holding office. The Law Department issued a resolution in favor of Belo. COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution directing its Law Department to file the appropriate Information against the petitioners for violation of Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code and directing the Clerk of the Commission to docket the electoral aspect of the complaint as a disqualification case. The herein petition assails Resolution COMELEC En Banc; the petitioners claim that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the resolution.

Issue: W/n the claim of the petitioners is tenable

Ruling: Yes. Under Section 2, Comelec Resolution No. 2050, the Comelec is mandated to dismiss a complaint for the disqualification of a candidate who has been charged with an election offense but who has already been proclaimed as the winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. In this case, the petitioners had

already been proclaimed winners on May 18, 2001, and the private respondents filed their complaint for the disqualification of petitioners only on June 23, 2001. The Comelec found probable cause against the petitioners for the offense charged, and directed its Law Department to file the appropriate Information. Clearly, then, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolution disqualifying the petitioners from the positions they were respectively elected to.

Lanot vs COMELEC

G.R. 164858 (428 SCRA 315)

November 16, 2006

Facts: Lanot and Eusebio were candidates for the 2004 mayoral elections on Pasig City. Lanot et al filed a petition for disqualification against Eusebio. Petiotioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside the designated campaign period, violation of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC order the disqualification of Eusebio but such disqualification was lifted upon approval his motion for reconsideration. The 2004 election was conducted; Eusebio received the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Mayor. Lanot filed a motion to annul Eusebio’s proclamation and to order his proclamation instead since he obtained the second highest number of votes. COMELEC refer the case to the Law department for investigation to determine the acts complained of were in fact committed by respondent Eusebio.

Issues: 1) W/N Eusebio should be disqualified for engaging election campaign outside the designated campaign period.

           2) W/N Lanot should be proclaimed as mayor if Eusebio id disqualified

Ruling: Euesbio should not be disqualified.

The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity, (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates, (3) the act is done outside the campaign period; Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a “candidate”  Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has filed a certificate of candidacy” to an elective public office. The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed. Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no “particular candidate or candidates” to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done “outside” the campaign period.

Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a “candidate” on 23 March 2004, even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are protected as part of freedom of expression of a citizen before he becomes a candidate for elective public office. Acts committed by Eusebio on or after 24 March 2004, or during the campaign period, are not covered by Section 80 which punishes only acts outside the campaign period.

The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated because of the disqualification. Votes cast in favor of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, against whom a petition for disqualification was filed before the election, are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he was qualified. For this reason, the second placer cannot be declared elected. The exception to this rule rests on two assumptions. First, the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified. Second, the voters are so fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but nonetheless the voters still cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Lanot and Benavides failed to prove that the exception applies in the present case. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Eusebio is disqualified, the rule on succession provides that the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Pasig City shall succeed in Eusebio’s place.

Aggabao vs COMELEC; Guerrero vs COMELEC, Ruiz and Fariñas; and Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

  

Aggabao vs COMELEC

Facts: Aggabao and Miranda were Congressional candidates of the 2004 elections. During the canvassing of COCVs (Certificate of canvass of votes) Miranda moved for the exclusion of the copy from Municipality of Cordon on the ground that it was tampered with thus manifest errors. The PBC (Provisional Board of Canvassers) excluded the contested COCVs; based on the results Miranda garnered the highest votes. On appeal with COMELEC Second Division Aggabao asserted that PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s Petition for exclusion. COMELEC En Banc directed the proclamation of Miranda as duly elected Congressman. Aggabao filed this petition for certiorari, assailing the proclamation of Miranda. He claimed that the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered Miranda’s proclamation considering that the appeal had not yet been resolved. In his Comment, Miranda moved for the dismissal of the petition considering that the issue raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Issue: W/n the petition of Aggabao in under jurisdiction of COMELEC or HRET

Ruling: The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such, petitioner’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is not this petition for certiorari.

The SC applied the same ruling in Guerrero case and Romuladez-Marcos case.

Guerrero vs COMELEC, Ruiz and Fariñas

Facts: Ruiz sought to disqualify Fariñas as candidate for the position of Congressman in the May 11, 1998 elections because Fariñas had been campaigning despite failure to file coc, the latter should be declared as “nuisance candidate” and be disqualified from running. Only on May 8, 1998 did Fariñas file his COC, substituting Chevylle Fariñas. On May 10 COMELEC dismiss the petition, “no coc to be cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified.” The elections pushed through, Fariñas obtained the highest number of votes and was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed motion for reconsideration contended that the substitution was invalid since Fariñas was not member of chevylle’s partylist. Meanwhile, Fariñas took his oath of office as member of the House of Representatives. Guerrero filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" contended that Fariñas, having failed to file his coc on or before the last day illegally resorted to the remedy of substitution thus; Fariñas’ disqualification was in order. COMELEC dismiss the motion of Ruiz and the petition of Guerrero for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner argued that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess and/or without jurisdiction in refusing to rule on the validity or invalidity of the candidacy of Fariñas.

Issue: Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?

Ruling: In the present case, SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over case of Fariñas had ceased with his assumption of office of as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Fariñas is recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable; in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.

Romualdez- Marcos (RM) vs COMELEC and Montejo

Facts: Petitioner filed her coc for the position of Representative of 1st District of Leyte. Montejo filed for cancellation and disqualification of Petitioner alleging that latter did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In Petitioner’s defense there was an honest mistake or misinterpretation regarding her residency. COMELEC filed a resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but on May 11, 1995, COMELEC issued a Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May, 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the May 8, 1995 election based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. On account of the Resolution disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat and the Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to SC for relief. Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Sec. 78 of the OEC. Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the HRET and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the HR in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution. 

Issues:

W/N the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the OEC for disqualification cases under Art. 78.

W/N the HRET assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

Ruling:

R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 88 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Section 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. - The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

It is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs COMELEC

Facts: Congress enacted an Act authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the voting and results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. COMELEC adopted in its Resolution a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its AES; namely, a. Voter Registration and Validation System; b. Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and c. Electronic Transmission. On January 24, 2003, PGMA issued an EO which allocated the fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an “Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid” COMELEC provided all the qualifications necessary before a bidder may participate.

For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections, COMELEC awarded the Contract to “Mega Pacific Consortium” (MPC) an entity that had not participated in the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with “Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.,” a company that joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements. Infotech, one of the bidders, now file a petition seeking to declare the award null and void alleging that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in arbitrarily failing to observe its own rules, policies and guidelines with respect to bidding process.

Issue: W/N COMELEC, the agency vested with the exclusive constitutional mandate to oversee elections, gravely abused its discretion when, in the exercise of its administrative functions, it awarded to MPC the contract for the 2nd phase of the comprehensive AES.

Ruling: Yes.

The public bidding system designed by COMELEC mandated the use of two—envelope, two—stage system. A bidder’s first envelope was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself. In the instant case, no such instrument was submitted to COMELEC during the bidding process. There is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported consortium.  The only logical conclusion is that no such agreement was ever submitted to the COMELEC for its consideration, as part of the bidding process.

It thus follows that, prior the award of the Contract, there was no documentary or other basis for COMELEC to conclude that a consortium had actually been formed amongst the firms. Had the proponent MPC been evaluated based solely on its own experience, financial and operational track record or lack thereof, it would surely not have qualified and would have been immediately considered ineligible to bid, as respondents readily admit. It is clear that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in arbitrarily failing to observe its own rules, policies and guidelines with respect to the bidding process, thereby negating a fair, honest and competitive bidding.

COMELEC failed to perform properly, legally, and prudently it legal mandate to implement the transition from manual to automated elections. COMELEC has not merely gravely abused its discretion in awarding the Contract for the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots. It has also put at grave risk the holding of credible and peaceful elections by shoddily accepting electronic hardware and software that admittedly failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements. As a necessary consequence of such nullity and illegality, the purchase of the machines and payments made have no basis whatsoever in law. The public funds expended pursuant to the void Resolution and Contract must therefore be recovered from the payees and/or from the persons who made possible the illegal disbursements, without prejudice to possible criminal prosecutions against them.

Furthermore, COMELEC and its officials concerned must bear full responsibility for the failed bidding and award, and held accountable for the electoral mess wrought by their grave abuse of discretion in the performance of their functions.

Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID COMELEC awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to MPC.